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CASE SUMMARIES
BANKRUPCIY
In re Ferco Fabricators, Inc., Husch &
Eppenberger, and Whitehead, 153
B.R. 40 (Bankr. E.D.Mo. 1993)- Robert J.
Whitehead (Whitehead) and William K. Freeman(Freeman)werepresidentandvicepresident, respectively, of FERCO Fabricators,
Inc. (FERCO). FERCO, represented by Husch
&Eppenberger (Husch), filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection on November 11,
1990. Whitehead and Freeman were
awarded over $25,000 in administrative
expenses for their role in the bankruptcy
process.
Whitehead later pled guilty to one count of
bankruptcy crime and agreed to cooperate in
the prosecution of Freeman for environmental and bankruptcy crimes. As a result of the
new information concerning Whitehead's
and Freeman's criminal activities, Husch
filed a motion to reconsider their administrative expenses award. The court found that
Husch was a party in interest as it had been
awarded attorney fees which had not yet
been paid and would be filing for additional
expenses as a result of this new information.
Rule 3008, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, applies the same standards set
out in Rule 60, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). These standards allow relief
from a judgment if based on a showing of
newly discovered evidence which could not
have been discovered under due diligence in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)
FRCP.
The court found that Husch had met this
standard as the indictments were not handed
down until after the award was granted.
Whitehead's and Freeman's failure to properly dispose of chemicals resulted in increased expenses to FERCO in terms of
winding up costs and removal costs. Therefore, the court barred Whitehead and Freeman from sharing in remaining funds to
recover their administrative expenses.
- Tom Ray

CERCLA
Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City
Powerl & Light Co., 1993 WL 141122
(8th Cir. 1993)- A manufactured gas plant
contaminated certain property in Mason
Cty, Iowa with coal gas tars and tar residues
before it ceased operating in 1931. Kansas
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City Power & Light Company (KCPL) purchased the site in 1932, disassembled the
gas plant and sold the property to Interstate
Power Company (IPQ in 1957. In 1984,
blasting operations by third-party defendant
Bob McKinness (McKinness) disturbed the
coal gas contaminants, causing pollution of
a nearby creek. After investigation, the Iowa
Department of Natural Resources (IDNR)
allowed McKinness to continue blasting.
KCPL alleged that McKinness' operations
caused contaminated soil to be deposited on
theproperty. In addition, KCPLclaimed that
pond waterbecame contaminated and seeped
into bedrock fissures.
The EPA targeted the site for cleanup
under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA). IPC agreed to clean up and sued
Iowa-Ilinois Gas & Electric Company, as
successor to the gas plant utility, and KCPL
to recover clean-up costs. KCPL then initiated third-party claims against McKinness
and Iowa-Illinois. McKinness filed fourthparty claims against IDNR and Mason City
and requested summary judgment on KCPL's
claims, arguing that it was not a "potentially
responsible person" under CERCLA.
The district court granted McKinness' motion for summary judgment, finding that
McKinness was not liable under 42 U.S.C. §
9607 (a) (3) because it had not arranged for
disposal of hazardous substances. (Although
KCPL had also alleged McKinness was an
ownerand operatorunder42 U.S.C. § 9607
(a) (1) and (2), it did not raise these issues in
response to McKinness' motion for summary judgment) KCPL filed a motion to
reconsider under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 60 (b), which the court
denied. KCPL alternatively requested that
the summary judgment ruling be entered as
afinaljudgmentunder Rule 54 (b), which was
granted. KCPL then appealed both the
summary judgment and the denial of its
motion to reconsider. The appellate court
sought to determine whether the Rule 54 (b)
motion was effective. Ifnot, the court would
lack jurisdiction.
Rule 54 (b) permits a district court to
"direct the entry of a final judgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay." The
appellate court found the Rule 54 (b) determination by the district court to be inappro-
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priate. It noted that the district court had
treated KCPL's motion to reconsider as a
Rule 60 (b) motion. It denied the motion
because Rule 60 (b)applies only to motions
for relief from final judgments. When the
motion to reconsider was decided, the summary judgment order was not considered
final. The court noted that under Rule 54(b),
a non-final order may be revised at any time
before the entry of judgment on all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties. Accordingly, thedistrict court should
have addressed KCPL's motion to reconsider on its merits. Because it failed to so do,
the appellate court deemed the Rule 54 (b)
finding to be inappropriate.
McKinness argued that KCPL failed to
respond to the motion for summary judgment and consequently surrendered its claims
under § 9607. The appellate court rejected
this argument, stating that even if an opposing party failed to challenge the motion for
summary judgment, the district court must
still decide that the moving party would be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to
that claim.
The court additionally noted that an appeal on a third-party claim was improper
until the primary dispute was decided. The
district court, therefore, abused its discretion
in making a Rule 54 (b)determination.
- Michelle Vokoun

Stewman v. Mid-South Wood Prods.
ofMena, Inc., 1993 WL 165308 (8th Cir.
1993) - The plaintiffs, neighbors of a previous Superfund cleanup site near Mena, Arkansas, brought suit against the site owners,
engineering consultants, and the firm which
completed the actual cleanup for contamination of their property. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs
had not established that a release of hazardous substances into the environment had
occurred, thus nullifying their Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) claim for
response costs.
The plaintiffs plead claims for damages for
the diminution in property value, common
law claims for negligence and trespass, and
also sought to recover CERCLA response
costs. The plaintiffs had taken samples of
dust and water on their land which indicated
levels of PCP, arsenic, chromium, and copper in excess of a "natural amount." The
plaintiffs attempted to establish that these
hazardous substances had been released
from the former Superfund site asa result of
an unsuccessful cleanup and contamination
during the actual cleanup operation.
The EPA had issued an Interim Closeout
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Report in 1989 which found that all remedial
activities had been completed and required
monitoring of the Superfund site for 30
years. The state environmental agency's
water discharge permits for the area require
regularly testing for PCP, arsenic, and chromium.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's finding that no release or threatened
release of the hazardous substances had
occurred from the Superfund site. After a
review of the trial court record, the appellate
court accepted the testimony of the
defendant's toxicologist that no release or
threatened release had occurred and that
chromium, copper, and arsenic are naturally
occurring substances in water and soil.
The court agreed with the holdings in
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, 889 F.2d 664
(5th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.
1992) that there is no minimum quantitative
requirement to establish a release or threatened release of hazardous substances under
CERCLA.
By concurring with the Fifth and Third
Circuit that there is no minimum quantitative
requirement to determine when a release has
occurred, the court stated that no rigid standard will be fixed for determining when the
quantity of a release is sufficient to establish
a CERCLA claim for response costs. Meanwhile, the court dismissed the plaintiffs assertion that a release of hazardous substances had occurred at this site.
- Anthony P. Farrell

United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Morrison Grain Co., Inc.,_ 1993 WL
266959 (10th Cr. 1993) -Morrison Grain
Company (Morrison Grain) and Cropland
Chemical Company created Agro Marketing
Company (Agro) as a joint venture to handle,
sell, buy and store agricultural chemicals. In
1983, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) found hazardous
substances in large quantities inadequately
stored in disintegrating containers at Agro's
facility in Latham, Illinois. Morrison Grain
entered into a partial consent decre'ewith the
EPA to pay $120,368 of the total $231,024
the EPA incurred in response costs under
CERCLA.
In 1985, Morrison Grain notified the U.S.
EPA and the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Illinois EPA) of leaking chemicals at a facility in Meredosia, Illinois. The

U.S. EPA and the Illinois EPA ordered
Morrison Grain to clean up the site at its own
expense. Morrison complied at a cost of
$214,000.
Morrison Grain filed claims with its insurers to recover its response cos ts under general liability policies then in effect. Each
insurer denied coverage citing the policies'
language. This language exclu ded coverage
of damage resulting from the discharge of
pollutants onto the land. Exem pted from the
exclusion is damage from "sudden and accidental" discharges.
The Tenth Circuit Court o f Appeals affirmed the district court in holding that the
term "accidental" was defined as happening
unexpectedly from a subjectiv e viewpoint.
"Sudden" is given an objective nterpretation
of swiftness. The court followe dKansas law,
which the court held governed the policies,
that contracts are to be read as a whole and
meaning given to each term. Thus the court
rejected the argument that the phrase "sudden and accidental" should be read as one
unit and therefore given one m eaning which
would reduce "sudden" to surplusage. As
the releases occurred over tim e, they were
not sudden and were therefo re excluded
from coverage under the term of the polaes.
- Tom Ray
Cook et al. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
147 F.R.D. 237 (D. Colo. 1993 - In fallout
from the Rocky Flats weapon production
facility grand jury investigation ,the United
States District Court for Colora do held that
a group of plaintiffs were not entitled to
discovery of the grand jury mat erials. While
the court held that the plaintiffs seeking class
certification for toxic tort litigaition against
Dow Chemical and Rockwell International
were entitled to further discove ry regarding
release of Comprehensive Er ivironmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) hazardous substanc es, the plaintiffs may not simply "piggyba ck" on the
grand jury investigation, but mu show that
the requested materials were relevant to the
civil claims.
In reviewing various discover yorders of a
U.S. Magistrate and motions or dismissal
under Federal Rules of Procedure11and37,
the court held that the plaintiffs can proceed
with further discovery of docu nents which
are relevant to their claims. The plaintiffs
raised both common lawand CEERCLA claims
and sought damages fora decrea sein market

value of their property, CERCLA response
costs, and bodily injury from radioactive and
hazardous substances released from Rocky
Flats, which was operated by Rockwell International.
The court held that: 1) the plaintiffs can
obtain the computerized indices to the Environmental Master File with respect to the site
to determine whether there were relevant
documents not presently in their possession;
2) plaintiffs are entitled to an extension of
time in which to submit expert reports on
dose estimation due to practical aspects of
the testing; 3) plaintiffs have sufficiently established a CERCLA claim for a threatened
release of hazardous substance without a
showing of existing contamination of bodies
or properties, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4);
and 4) plaintiffs are entitled to additional
discovery of environmental records generated by Rockwell at Rocky Flats without a
showing of the necessity for such documents, as the plaintiffs lacked the computerized indices for the voluminous documents.
The court found that there was no violation of Rules 11 or 37 as it was public
knowledge at the time of thefiling the second
amended complaint that Rocky Flats had
been closed after an FBI and EPA raid of the
facility due to safety concerns about the
handling of hazardous substances, and a
grand jury had been empaneled to investigate environmental crimes at Rocky Flats
after the raid.
This decision will allow the plaintiffs' action to proceed as plaintiffs have shown that
they have a Rule 11 basis for their CERCLA
claim, and have shown practical difficulties in
processing and presenting current discovery. Thecourtreluctantlyalowed expansion
of the discovery requests under the Federal
Rules, which eventually may include materials subpoenaed by the grand jury to the
extent the plaintiffs can show that these
materials are relevant to their claims for
reasons independent of the fact that they
were considered by the grand jury.
- Anthony P. Farrell
Tt
United States v. Smuggler-Durant
Mining Corp., 1993 WL 198814 (D. Colo.
1993) -Smuggler-Durant's mining operations on Smuggler Mountain in the 1800's
and 1900's resulted in mining dumps, mill
tailings and other waste being deposited
throughout a 110 acre site located in Pitkin
County, Colorado. The U.S. alleged that
lead and cadmium, both hazardous sub-
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stances, existed in high concentration
throughout the site. Portions of the site have
been developed for residential use although
the Smuggler Mountain mine is still in operation.
The U.S. also alleged that Pitkin County
acquired a portion of the site, known as
Mollie Gibson Park, in 1983. In addition, the
U.S. alleged that Centennial-Aspen disposed
of the hazardous soil from the park and that
the County removed the dumps and tailings
containing the hazardous substances and
used it as foundation for roads, both on and
off the site.
The U.S. brought this action to recover
response costs incurred as a result of the
release and threatened release of hazardous
substances at the site. This case decided the
U.S.' motion to strike certain affirmative
defenses raised by the County,
The court summarily struck the county's
defenses that the U.S. had failed to state a
claim for relief and that the claims were
frivolous and groundless. The complaint
alleged a release or threatened release of
hazardous substances atthe site which caused
the U.S. to incur response costs, that the
County presently owned part of the site, and
that the County owned part of the site at the
time of the disposal of the hazardous substances. This was held to state a claim under
§ 107(a) of CERCLA (42 U.S.C. 9607(A)).
The County also raised the defense of lack
of jurisdiction. This defense was also quickly
stricken as the County conceded jurisdiction
in its response to the U.S.' motion.
The County raised the equitable defenses
of laches and statutes of limitations, the
doctrine of unclean hands, the failure to
mitigate damages, estoppel, waiver, consent
and release, and equity as well as the defenses of failure to join an indispensable
party and that the claim was barred because
any releases were de minimis. Again, the
court quicidy struck these defense, because
§ 107(b) provides an exclusive list of defenses which does not include any of the
above.
The court upheld the County's defenses
that the releases of the hazardous substances
were caused solelybyan actof Godorbyacts
or omissions by third parties over whom the
County had no control. The court ruled that
these defenses presented mixed questions of
law and fact and were not subject to a motion
to strike.
The County also raised the defense that
the costs incurred were unnecessary and
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inconsistent with the national contingency
plan (NCP). The defense furthe r stated that
a declaratory judgment action s barred because it cannot be determined whether any
future costs are necessary an d consistent
with the NCP. It also stated that the U.S. had
failed to provide an accounting of response
costs. The court recognized a defense that
the costs were not consistent with the NCP
but struck all other defenses. The court
further stated the allegations that costs are
unreasonable or not cost-effe tive do not
constitute a defense under CER CI.A.
The County defense that it is not liable for
response costs because the remiediation plan
adopted provides that the pro perty owned
by the County will be used as a d epositoy for
contaminated soil from proper ty at the site
which is owned by persons ot]her than the
county and therefore executior of the plan
will exacerbate any hazardou s conditions
that are present. The court stated that it did
not understand this defense a rid that the
parties should provide further b iefing on the
issue.
The court struck three defe nses dealing
with the appropriateness of join t and several
liability because the U.S. was not seeking
joint and several liability.
The County also raised the defenses that
the remediation plan will result i nan unlawful
taking of the County's property and that the
County is entitled to set-off for t he actions of
the U.S. which will damage t he County's
property. The court held that these are not
allowable defenses under CERC LA and that
such a claim for recoupment should be in the
form of a counterclaim of an independent
action.
Finally, the County sought to incorporate
the affirmative defenses raised by all other
defendants. The court held t iat Rule 8(c)
requires a defendant to set foit h each affirmative defense in its answer and if the
County wants to raise addition al affirmative
defenses, it must seek leave to do so pursuant to Rule 15. Therefore, this defense was
also stricken.
- Tom Ray
Dresher, Inc., v. BNY O ne Capital
Corp., 1993 WL 195341 (N.D. I. 1993)
- In 1987, Dresher, Inc. (Dres ier) acquired
Hanis-Hub Company (Harris- Hub), a bed
frame and furniture manufactur er, pursuant
to a written stock purchase agreement
whereby Dresher was to pur chase all of
Harris-Hub's stock. At the tim e of the sale
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the shareholders included defendants BNY
One Capital Corporation (as apparent successor to Irving Capital Corporation) (BNY),
First Small Business Investment Company of
California (FSB), Roger Harris, Joan Pikas;
Penny Block, and Arthur W. Brown, Jr.
Included in the agreement was a clause
providing that indemnification would be the
exclusive remedy of the parties for "any and
all breaches of representation, warranty or
agreement contained" therein.
After purchasing Harris-Hub, Dresher
hired environmental consultants to investigate company plant sites. The investigations
revealed that, due to the release of hazardous
materials and illegally maintained storage
tanks, extensive removal of contaminated
soil and toxic materials was necessary.
Dresher incurred more than $1.5 milion in
expenses from the ensuing cleanup and
expects additional costs from future removal.
Because of these costs, Dresherfiled three
separate counts against defendants. Defendants in Count Iinclude BNY, FSB, Al Harris
and Bruce Pikas as "owners" or "operators"
of the plant as defined by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601 et seq. Dresher claimed that
CERCLA provisions required the removal of
the soil and materials because of the "release" or "threatened release" of hazardous
substances. It also alleged that it was entitled
to recover its expenses under CERCLA for
the removal performed and any required in
the future. In Counts 11and IIl, Dresher
alleged against defendants BNY, FSB, Roger
Harris, Joan Pikas, Stock, and Brown, as
trustee, breach of warranties regarding environmental matters in the purchase agreement.
Section 107(a) of CERCLA authorizes
private entities to recover costs from responsible parties incurred in cleaning up hazardouswastedisposalsites. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
BNY and FSB asserted that, because of the
indemnification clause in thepurchase agreement, Dresher failed in Count I to state a
claim on which relief could be granted. They
also claimed, with the other defendants, that
Counts Hand III lacked supplemental subject
matterjurisdictionrequiredbyafederalcour
The court dismissed Count Iagainst BNY
and FSB, holding that state law will gover
claims against them because the parties'
agreement expressly provided "a bar to a
CERCLA claim in favor of an exclusive
remedy through indemnification ansB
(under -
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nois law] for breach of a seller's warranty." It
stated that it had "previously permitted parties to contract privately for the distribution
of CERCLA liability among themselves" in
Village of Fox River Grove v. Grayhill,
Inc., 806 F.Supp. 785, 792 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
It reasoned that the indemnification clause
enforces CERCLA's liability provisions for
hazardous waste polluters. However, because defendants Al Harris and Bruce Pikas
answered the complaint, the court retained
jurisdiction over them and was thus required
to resolve subject matter jurisdiction questions regarding defendants in Counts II and
III brought by Dresher under state law. The
court held that it retained jurisdiction over
the Second and Third Counts under "supplemental" jurisdiction. It noted that under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a), federal courts havesupplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
where they form part of the same "case or
controversy" as the federal claims. The court
focused on the fact that, although different
legal elements composed the lattertwo claims,
proof of them would intertwine with the proof
required for Count I.
-

Dan Coughlin

Emergency Tecnical Servs. Corp. of
II. v. Morton Int', Inc., 1993WL210531
(N.D.Ill. 1993) -Plaintiff, Emergency Technical Services Corporation of Illinois (ETSC)
specializes in disposal of hazardous wastes.
ETSC sought a declaratory judgment that it
was not liable to defendants Radiac Research
Corporation (Radiac), SAFT America, Inc.
(SAFT) and Morton International, Inc.
(Morton) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). The defendants filed
counterclaims against ETSC under CERCLA
for cleanup costs of Groce Labs, a hazardous
waste site.
Defendant SAFT manufactures battery
systems, which create a hazardous by-product SAFT approached Irwin Kraut, vice
president of ETSC to find a site to dispose of
the by-product. Mr. Kraut located Groce
Labs in Greer, South Carolina, to dispose of
the waste.
Defendant Radiac is in the business of
waste disposal. Radiac contacted ETSC for
help in finding a site to dispose of hazardous
wastes produced by Radiac's clients. ETSC
suggested Groce Labs.
Defendant Morton also contacted ETSC
for help in finding a waste disposal site.
ETSC again recommended Groce Labs to

handle the waste disposal.
Each of the defendants' transactions with
Groce Labs were conducted through ETSC.
ETSC assessed each defendant's waste disposal needs, considering the nature of the
waste. It issued price quotations for the
disposal, facilitated transportation of the
waste, arranged shipping dates and provided
instructions on packaging the waste, among
other services. ETSC received a 30 to 35
percent markup on the amount Groce Labs
would receive for the disposal. The defendants paid ETSC, which in turn paid Groce
Labs for the services rendered.
Because ETSC arranged for the disposal,
the defendants claimed that it should be
jointly and severally liable with the defendants for cleanup under CERCLA. The
court addressed whether ETSC was a "responsible person" under § 107(a)(1) - (4), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). The court determined
that no genuine issue of material fact existed
and that the defendants were entitled to
judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
CERCLA provides that "arrangers" constitute responsible persons. "Arrangers"
include "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
The court stated that arranger liability should
be broadly construed to meet CERCLA's
remedial goals.
The court examined whether a "nexus"
existed between ETSC and the disposal of
the hazardous waste. The court stated that
such nexus could be found where a party
took affirmative action which resulted in
disposal at a site which ultimately released
the hazardous substance. A nexus could also
exist where the party controlled the handling
and disposal of the waste and, by failing to
act, determined the disposition of the waste.
The court found that a nexus existed in that
ETSC was actively involved in the timing,
manner and location of the disposal. The
court also noted that as long as the party was
somewhat involved, even if not actively, it
could still find the nexus. Consequently, the
court determined that ETSC was liable as a
person who "otherwise arranged" for disposal.
The court rejected ETSC's defense that
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the defendants made their own decisions to
dispose of their wastes at Groce Labs. Arranger liability, it explained, does not attach
onlyto thosewho make theultimatedecision
to dispose of their wastes at a particular site.
- Michelle Vokoun

Dico, Inc. v. Diamond, 821 F.Supp. 562
(S.D. Iowa 1993) - In September 1983, a
Des Moines trichloroethylene (TCE)site was
placed on the National Priorities List. On
July 21, 1986, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an Administrative
Order under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Iability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)
to Dico, Inc. (Dico) to clean up hazardous
substances at the TCE site. Two months
later, Dico submitted to the EPA a list of
requirements in the Order that it believed
were not appropriate or could hinder the
implementation of the cleanup.
In October 1986, Congress enacted the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). SARA created in
CERCLA a cause of action for reimbursement of cleanup costs to a non-liable party
who received and complied with an Administrative Order. To petition for reimbursement underSARA, the petitioner must prove
by a preponderance of evidence that it is not
liable for costs under § 9607(a) and that such
costs are reasonable. Ifthe EPA refuses to
grant the reimbursement, the petitioner may
file an action. The EPA agreed to some of
Dico's suggested changes between late October and late November. In July 1988, Dico
petitioned the EPA for reimbursement of
costs it incurred in carrying out the Order
which totalled $764,134.08 plus future costs.
In May 1992, the EPA issued a final
judgment denying Dico's petition based on
the fact that the reimbursement provision did
not apply to Dico as its Order was issued
prior to enactment of SARA. Under the
provisions of SARA, Dico filed an action in
July 1992 against the EPA seeking reimbursement of stated costs. This claim was
premised on CERCLA and the Due Process
and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The issue before the court was whether
the CERCLA reimbursement provision applies only to parties who both receive and/or
comply with an Administrative Order after
the effective date of SARA. The court
agreed with the EPA that its interpretation of
the reimbursement provision is consistent
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with SARA's statutory language, its history
and purpose and with the general principle
of narrowly interpreting waivers of sovereign
immunity.
Dico argued that it complied with a Modified Order issued after enactment of SARA
but the EPA contended that it did not agree
to all of Dico's suggested changes and that
whatever modifications were made, the original Order of July 21 required Dico to clean
up theTCE groundwater contamination site.
The court agreed that the Modified Order did
not change Dico's obligation to comply with
the Order or the EPA's right to enforce it.
The court rejected the EPA's argument
that it did not have jurisdiction over Dico's
claims under the Due Process and Takings
Clauses, but granted the EPA's motion to
dismiss thosetwo counts. The courtordered
Dico's claims for reimbursement under
CERCLA dismissed with prejudice and its
claims under the Due Process and Takings
Clauses dismissed without prejudice.
- Christine Hymes

United States v. Arrowhead Ref. Co.,
et al., 1993 WL 170966 (D. Minn. 1993)
- The United States District Court for Minnesota granted a motion for summary judgment for Chrysler Corporation which was
impleaded for response and remedial costs
under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) as a generator of hazardous substances. The court held that Chrysler was
not liable for the arrangements for the disposal of contaminated waste oil by one of its
dealers which was identified as a potentially
responsible party at the Arrowhead Refining
Company (Arrowhead) oil recycling plant.
Arrowhead had operated an oil recycling
plant at which waste oil was processed and
distilled to remove impurities. The hazardous product of the refining process was
deposited in a swampy area adjacent to the
plant. The refinery had accepted waste oil
from various sources, including Plaza Dodge,
a Chrysler dealership.
The Environmental Protection Agency
sought to recover response and remedial
costs under CERCLA from Arrowhead as
operator of the facility. Arrowhead brought
a third-party action against Plaza Dodge for
liability as a generator of the hazardous
substances. Plaza Dodge then sued Chrysler
for liability as an independent generator of
the hazardous substances.
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Chrysler first attempted to rely on an
agreement of denial of an agency relationship between itself and Plaza Dodge which
the court viewed as similar to a "hold harmless" agreement. The court held that while
the parties are free to characterize their
relationship in any way they choose, this
agreement will not serve to absolve Chrysler
from CERCLA liability.
The court found that the relationship between Chrysler and Plaza Dodge lacked the
crucial nexus to hold the parent corporation
liable for the ads of its subsidiary. While
Chrysler had directed many of the marketing
and sales aspects of Plaza Dodge, Chrysler
had not controlled or influenced the dealer's
choice regarding disposal of waste oil. The
court also found no duty of Chrysler in
CERCLA or otherwise to ensure that its
dealer had properly disposed of its waste oil.
The court neglected to pierce the corporate veil of Chrysler by finding that the degree
of control and actual participation or involvement by Chrysler in the dealer's affairs had
only been akin to that of a creditor-debtor.
Thus the court granted Chrysler's motion for
summary judgment, finding Chrysler not
liable as a independent generator of hazardous substances.
-

Jason Johnson

HAZARDOUS WASTE
Mueller, et al. v. United States Envt'l
ProtectionAgency, Atlas Envt'l Servs.
Inc., 1993 WL 171848 (8th Cir. 1993) The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
the petitioners' petition for review of a final
order denying review of the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) approval of a
permit for a storage/feed handling facility
adjacent to a planned hazardous waste incinerator. The court dismissed the petitioners'
four arguments in their petition for review as
being insufficient for a hearing, holding that
the EPA had considered all of the relevant
factors, its decision contains no clear error,
and the petitioner had waived many of their
arguments before reaching the court
Atlas Environmental Services, Inc. had
applied for a joint permit from the EPA and
the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR)to build and operate a hazardous waste incinerator and related structures
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 69016992K The EPA issued its portion of the
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permit for a storage/feed handling building,
where limited quantities of waste would be
stored and prepared for incineration.
The four petitioners filed a petition for
review with the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board, which denied their request for
review without a hearing. The Regional
Administrator issued a final permit decision,
and the petitioners then filed a petition for
review in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The petitioner argued that: 1) the EPA
permit inappropriately incorporates provisions of the Missouri permit, the Missouri
permit is not binding on the incinerator's
landowner, and the EPA's incorporation
refers to incorrect sections of the Missouri
permit; 2) there was not sufficient geological
and hydrological information as: (a) Atlas
had submitted only preliminary studies, (b)
there was no evidence that the storage/feed
handling building will comply with federal
performance standards, (c) the environmental report contains inapplicable information
and is not a detailed "geological assessment," and (d) there is no evidence that
construction design details or specifications
have been submitted to the EPA; 3) the EPA
could not sufficiently evaluate the quality of
existing ground waters based on the information it had; and 4) the permit application
itself identifies risk to human health.
The court found that the petitioners had
waived their first argument by failing to raise
the issue during the comment period or
before the Environmental Appeals Board
(pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 129.19(a),(e)) and
because the EPA's incorporation of the incorrect sections of the Missouri permit was a
harmless typographical error. On the second argument, the court again found that the
petitioners had waived the contention that
Atlas had not submitted construction design
details or specifications by failing to raise the
issue during the comment period or before
the Environmental Appeals Board. With
respect to the contention that Atlas only
submitted preliminary studies to the EPA,
the court reviewed the evidence submitted
and found that the EPA considered the
relevant factors and thus its decision was not
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law."
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
The court also found that the EPA had
considered the relevant factors in the third
argument as the EPA had reviewed ample
ground water quality information. The court
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also rejected petitioners' fourth argument
because the Missouri portion of the permit
addresses the safety of the incinerator's operation, and because the EPA permit contains requirements to insure that the explosives are handled safely.
In a footnote, the court noted that the
Missouri DNR's portion of the permit is now
on appeal in the Missouri courts.
- Anthony P. Farrell

Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie
Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian
Community, 991 F.2d 458 (8thCir. 1993)
- The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act (Act), 49 U.S.C. app. A, § 1811, preempted a tribal nuclear radiation control
ordinance which required transporters to
obtain a tribal license, and that a preliminary
injunction to prevent enforcement of the
ordinance was appropriate.
The Sioux Indian Community in Minnesota had enacted an ordinance which required transporters to obtain a tribal license
for each shipment of nuclear materials across
reservation land. Northern States Power
Company (NSP) brought a declaratory judgment action for a ruling that the tribal ordinance is preempted by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. The district court
granted the preliminary injunction requested
by NSP against application of the Prairie
Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community ordinance until resolution of the declaratory judgment action.
NSP operates its Prairie Island nuclear
plant near the Prairie Island Indian Community Reservation, where the only current
ground access for NSP's seventy shipments
of nuclear materials per year to or from the
plant is by a railroad or a county road, both
of which cross the reservation. The
Mdewakanton Tribal Council ordinance
required that transporters obtain a separate
tribal license for each shipment of nuclear
material, and that license applications must
be filed 180 days in advance of the shipment
and be accompanied by an application fee of
$1,000. The ordinance also gave the Tribal
Council the authority to determine whether
toissuealicense, andto imposea $1,000,000
civil fine for willful violations of the ordinance.
The court of appeals held that the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act preempted
the tribal ordinance regulating transporta-

tion of nuclear materials over the Indian
reservation. Relying on congressional intent, as demonstrated by language indicating
that the act preempt local regulations which
are an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the goals of the Act, andSouthern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 909 F.2d 352, 358-9 (9th Cir.
1990), the court found the district court did
not err in denying the tribe's motion to
dismiss. Noting that in Southern Pac. and
in ColoradoPub. Util. Com m'n v. Harmon,
951 F.2d 1571, 1582-3 (10th Cir. 1991),
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits had held that
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
preempted less stringent regulations than
those of the Mdewakanton Tribal Community, the court concluded that the tribe's
notice and licensing requirements for nuclear
materials were also preempted by the Act.
ThecourtfurtherfoundthattheActwaived
the tribe's sovereign immunity from compliancesuits under 49 U.S.C. app. A, § 181 1(a)(d), and that the district court correctly applied the four-factor test from Dataphase
Sys., Inc. v. C-L-S Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109,
113 (8th Cir. 1981) when it issued the
preliminary injunction. In considering the
grant of the preliminary injunction by the
district court, the court of appeals found that
the issuance of the injunction was proper
because the tribal ordinance is preempted by
the Hazardous Materials Transportation and
is not a legitimate exercise of the tribe's
sovereign powers.
-

Anthony P. Farrell

Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas
Dep't of Pollution Control, 992 F.2d
145(8th Cir. 1993)-TheArkansas Department of Pollution Control (Department)
sought to incinerate thousands of drums
containing dioxin-contaminated hazardous
waste. The Arkansas Peace Center (Peace
Center), asserting that the incineration was
in violation of federal and state regulations,
received a temporary restraining order (TRO)
from the district court. The Department then
filed an interlocutory appeal and a motion for
stay pending appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292 (b). The Eighth Circuit granted the stay
pending appeal of the TRO.
The district court subsequently granted a
preliminary injunction in favor of the Peace
Center. The Eighth Circuit then granted a
temporary stay of the preliminary injunction,
leaving the issue of whether the Eighth Cir-
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cult should grant the Department's motion
for stay pending appeal of the grant of the
preliminary injunction.
The Department as the party seeking the
stay, was required to show: 1) it was likely to
succeed on the merits; 2) it would have
suffered irreparable injury without the stay;
3) no substantial harm would come to other
interested parties; and 4) the stay would not
harm the public interest.Hilton u.Braunskill,
107 S.Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987). The court felt
these burdens were met as the Department
was likely to succeed on the issues of subject
matter jurisdiction; the Department would
suffer irreparable harm by not being allowed
to fulfill its public duty in cleaning up the
hazardous waste; other parties would not
suffer substantial harm; and the stay protected the public interest by destroying thousands of environmentally threatening drums.
The court specially acknowledged its concem over the general threat from incineration but noted the presence of continuous
monitoring by the Department and a detailed
risk assessment which gave no cause for
alarm.
-Tom Ray
Williams v. Monsanto Co., 1993 WL
189554 (Mo.App. 1993) - The Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held
that the plaintiff, Robert Williams, Sr., failed
to show that he was entitled to a verdict as a
matter of law on his nuisance claim, and also
had not shown substantial damage to his
property to overcome a directed verdict ona
trespass claim against defendant Monsanto
Company. The plaintiff claimed that a
Monsanto chemical plant abutting his automobile repair business emitted particulate of
sodium tripolyphoshate (STP) that caused
pitting of the paint on customers' cars and
the subsequent closing of his business.
On appeal, the court reviewed the evidence presented by plaintiff and defendant
to the trial court and the jury and found that
the trial court ruled correctly in directing a
verdict on the trespass claim and in denying
plaintiff's motion for judgment not withstanding the jury's verdict for the defendant
on the nuisance claim. On the trespass
claim, the court held that plaintiffs evidence
had not dealt with the damage which the
STP did to the property itself, and thus
plaintiff had not shown an actual interference with the possession of the land as
required by Missouri law on trespass involv-

E L PR I

101

Vol. 1 * No. 2 * Fall 1993
ing pollutants. While plaintiff was allowed by
the trial court to reach the jury on his nuisance claim, the jury found for the defendant
on that issue.
The court's decision clearly differentiates
the evidence and elements needed to prove
nuisance and trespass claims involving pollutants. Citing Maryland Heights Leasing,
Inc. v. Mallinckrodt,706 S.W. 2d 218 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985), the court states, "for trespass to lie the pollution must be at a level so
as to constitute an actual interference with
the possession of the land, not merely interference with its use and enjoyment." The
court then stated "nuisance requires that one
unreasonably use his property such that it
substantially impairs the rights of another to
peacefully use his property," citingRacine v.
Glendale Shooting Club, Inc., 755 S.W. 2d
369 (Mo.App. 1986). Here the court found
that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient
evidence to establish either trespass or nuisance.
While the plaintiff had claimed that the
STP had caused pitting of customers' cars,
other evidence presented showed Monsanto
had attempted to diagnose and correct the
STP problem, no other neighbors had complained about STP fall-out, and plaintiffs'
business was apparently alosing proposition
before any complained of emissions occurred.
- Anthony P. Farrell

Patz v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 817 F.Supp. 781 (E.D.Wis. 1993) Patz Sales, Inc. (Patz) disposed of its industrial waste by placing portions of it in a
seepage pit and burying other portions in
barrels. Both of these sites were located on
the company's premises.
The Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources determined that groundwater beneath the Patz's property was contaminated
and ordered the removal of the seepage pit,
removal of thebarrels, and future groundwater monitoring. Patz contacted its insurer,
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St Paul) to seek payment. St. Paul
refused as the insurance agreement with
Patz was for liability purposes only and
specifically excluded damages to property
owned by or under the control of Patz.
The dispute was tried in the U.S. district
court since the action was between parties of
different states and the amount in question
exceeded $50,000. Following Erie v.
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Tompkins, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938 ),Wisconsin
substantive law was applied.
The court held that St. Paul vas required
to pay for the cost of removing the seepage
pitandbarrelssincethecontamin atedgroundwater was the public's, not Pat 's, property
under Wisconsin statute. Th e court also
cited a 1992 Wisconsin Court of Appeals
decision which held that own ed-property
exclusions do not apply where the primary
risk is not to the property of th einsured but
to third-parties' property, incl uding public
property.
The court further held that, a s a matter of
policy, immediate remediatior should be
taken before contamination ca n spread to
other private property. Thus, public policy
dictates that in order to preve nt additional
environmental harm, owned-iproperty exclusions should not be allowe'd to hinder
clean-ups on private property.
- Tom Ray
Sierra Club v. Chemical Handling
Corp., 1993WL214131 (D.Colo.)-PlaintiffSierra Club (Sierra)sueddefendantChemical Handling Corporation (CHS) for injunctive and declaratory relief and civil penalties
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et
seq. Sierra claimed that CHS stored hazardous waste at its Broomfield, Colorado facility
without a permit in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
6925(a).
The court had previously granted CHS
summary judgment on the claim, having
found that Colorado law superseded the
claims. Sierra then filed motions to amend
its complaint to allege violations of the Colorado hazardous waste program and to reconsider the summary judgment.
The Colorado statute, Coto. REv. STAT.
25-15-308(1)(b) and 6 C.C.R. 1007-3, Part
100, lacks a citizen suit provision. The
question before the court, therefore, was
whether RCRA's citizen suit provision could
apply to state statutes and regulations.
Under RCRA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may authorize states to
administer hazardous waste regulatory programs that are consistent with the federal
program "in lieu" of RCRA regulations. The
court found that because RCRA authorized
Colorado's program, Sierra could bring a
RCRA citizen suit.
The court's decision was based in part
upon the importance of citizen suits to RCRA
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enforcement. The court recognized that
citizens who live near hazardous waste facilities are often the most persistent enforcers of
RCRA.
- Michelle Vokoun

SEWAGE DISTRICT
Beatty v. The Metro. St. Louis Sewer
Dist., 1993 WL 199155 (Mo.App. E.D.) The Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District
(MSD) was created by St. Louis voters in
1954 to consolidate the management of the
various sewer systems in St. Louis City and
St Louis County. The MSD was given the
power to raise operating revenue through
direct property taxes and by levying service
fees.
In 1980, the voters of Missouri amended
article X, § 22 of the Missouri Constitution
(the Hancock Amendment) to prohibit ising taxes or fees without a majority vote in
the affected county or other political subdivision.
The MSD submitted a proposed fee increase to the voters of St. Louis County and
St. Louis City. The proposal was defeated.
The MSD then, after public hearings, promulgated two new ordinances reducing the
capital improvement surcharge by four dollars and increasing the wastewater charge by
four dollars. The total amount of sewer fees
remained unchanged.
Plaintiffs filed suit arguing that increasing
the wastewater charge without receiving a
majorityvoteatthepollsviolatedtheHancock
Amendment.
The court applied the five point test established in Kelly v. Marion County Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. banc
1991) to determine if the contested fees
were subject to the Hancock Amendment.
Together, the following points of this test
show whether a fee is actually a user fee or
is really a tax labeled as a fee.
The first point is: When is the fee paid?
Taxes are usually paid periodically regardless
of services rendered while user fees are
collected immediately before or after the
service is provided. The MSD fees are
collected from the vast majority of customers
quarterly or monthly, regardless of the service provided. The MSD fee therefore more
closely resembles a tax than a user fee.
The second point is: Who pays the fee? A
tax is usually applied to almost all of the
residents of a political subdivision while a
user fee is charged only to those who actually
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benefit from the service provided. The MSD
fee is charged to almost all of th eresidents of
St. Louis County and St. Lot is City who
receive running water, and there foreis closer
to a tax than a user fee.
The third point is: Is the amo unt of the fee
charged affected by the amoun t of services
provided to the resident? The MSD fee is
based on the average sewage discharge for
each type of living unit (i.e. sin gle family or
multi-family homes). The MS ) fee then is
like a tax as it is applied regfardless of a
resident's sewage output.
The fourth point is: Is the government
providing a service? The court noted that
governments always provide a service when
assessing a fee or a tax. The cc iurt held that
the more critical question is: Is t he service for
which the fee is assessed ma ndatory and
universal or optional and singula r? The MSD
fee is mandatory for all residen ts within the
MSD, and therefore is a tax, nc t a user fee.
The fifth point is: Has the activity historically and exclusively been pro vided by the
govemment? Sewerservices haye long been
provided by both government al units and
private organizations. Within S t. Louis City,
the government has always prc vided sewer
service. Therefore, the servic e has been
provided historically and exclu sively by the
govemment in St. Louis City.
Considering all of these points, the court
found that the MSD fee is closer to a tax than
a user fee. Consequently, the MSD fee is
subject to the Hancock Amen dment. Accordingly, the court ordered t hat the two
ordinances be vacated as violating the
Hancock Amendment and orde red that they
be submitted to the people for a vote as soon
as possible.
- Tom Ray
WATER
Heins Implement Co., et al. v. Missouri Hwy. and Transp. C omm'n, et
al., 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 19 93) - The
Highway and Transportation Commission
(HTC) condemned land belonging to Heins
Implement Company (Heins) to build a highway bypass. HTC had a culvert constructed
underneath the bypass to ac commodate
normal rainfall, but it proved to be inadequate for this purpose. As a res ult, flooding
occurred on Heins' land destrc yng equipment and crops. Heins brought suit against
HTC, the general contractor, th e engineer,
and the owner of an adjacent lak The trial

court sustained -TC's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on Heis' claim
for inverse condemnation, and granted summary judgement for the claims agais the
other defendants and for the negligence and
nuisance claims against HTC. Upon transfer
by the Missouri Court of Appeals, the MissouriSupremeCourt reversedand remanded
the trial court's judgment for lTC on Heis'
claim, but affirmed the other judgments.
The Supreme Court found that the Coimon Enemy Doctrine, which lTC relied on
and which states that landowners are able to
do whatever necessary to protect their property from common enemies, was no longer
appicableinsituationsinvolvngsurfacewater
runoff. The Court reasoned that this doctine did not give adequate guidance on what
a landowners duty of care would be when
taking action to divert surface waters. In its
place, the Court held that a rule of reasonableness would better promote optimum
land use while ensuring equal distribution of
costs attributed to competing interests in
land use. This rule states that while a landowner is entitled to any reasonable use of his
land, this landowner will be liable if the
impact to others arising from his interference
with surface water results from intentional
and unreasonable acts, or if the landowner's
acts are negligent, recless, or in the course
of an abnormally dangerous activity.
After adopting the rule of reasonableness,
the Court found that the only proper claim
against an entity with the power of eminent
domain is for inverse condemnation and not
negligence or nuisance. The Court further
found that the flooding caused by HTC's
failure to install an adequate culvert was
sufficient to reverse the trial court's judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. HTC argued
that res judicata barred Heins' cause of
action, but the Court found that HTC had
waived this defense. Even though Heins
received compensation at the original condemnation proceedings, this did not preclude any recovery for the unanticipated
flooding.
Because Hes filed a motion for a new
trial or for a redetermination of the damage
award before the trial court granted HTC's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the Court further reversed the trial
court's denial of Hems' motion for a new
trial. In addition, the Court affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment as to all
other claims against the defendants.
te.
- Alyse Hakami
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United States v. Idaho ex rel. Director, Id. Dept. of WaterResources, 113
S.Ct. 1893 (1993) - In US. v. Idaho, the
United States Supreme Court held that because the McCarran Amendment [43 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)] does not contain a specific waiver
of the United States' sovereign immunity,
the United States is not obligated to pay an
estimated $10 million filing fee in a state
water rights adjudication. The Court stated
that a specific waiver of sovereign immunity
is required before the United States may be
held liable for these types of fees.
Under the McCarran Amendment, Idaho
commenced a comprehensive water rights
adjudication for the Snake River Basin. Idaho
requires the payment of filing fees for each
notice of claim before the notice can be
accepted by the Director of the Department
of Water Resources. Idaho Code § 42-1414
(1990). The United States claimed it-was not
obligated to pay the filing fee because the
McCarran Amendment did not waive its
sovereign immunity. After an adverse decision from the Idaho Supreme Court on the
sovereign immunity issue, the United States
petitioned for a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court.
In reversing the Idaho Supreme Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the qualification in the McCarran Amendment that "no
judgment for costs" shall be entered against
the United States, did not contain a specific
waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity with respect to the filing fees. While
recognizing that the terms "fees" and "costs"
normally have different meanings, the Court
held that Idaho legislation often blurred the
line between the two terms, such that "fees"
under the Idaho legislation could be encompassed within the meaning of "costs" from
which the United States would be immune
under the McCarran Amendment.
The Supreme Court stated that waivers of
federal sovereign immunity must be "unequivocally expressed" in the statutory text.
While rejecting both parties' construction of
the McCarran Amendment, the Court found
that the McCarran Amendment did not explicitly waive the sovereign immunity of the
United States for this type of filing fee.
- Anthony P. Farrell
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